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DASEIN’S “POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING” IN A 
WASTELAND: THE CASE OF AUSTER’S IN THE 
COUNTRY OF LAST THINGS 
Abstract 
This paper proposes a reading of Paul Auster’s novel In the Country of Last Things 
(1987) through the conceptual lens of Heidegger’s theory of Dasein. It focuses on 
Heidegger’s definition of human nature as Dasein by discussing the range of 
existential possibilities that the German philosopher outlined for human beings in 
order to make authentic sense of their being and life before death. The progression 
from birth to death constitutes Dasein’s state of being or its existence. However, not 
many individuals are conscious of this process, being lost in the limiting situation 
of their everydayness. Accordingly, inauthentic lives without understanding one’s 




true possibilities take place. A fictional visualization of Dasein’s attempts at an 
authentic existence within its limiting situation or, we could say, within its typical 
society, can concretize Heidegger’s points in a better way. Concerning Paul Auster’s 
existential outlook on life, In the Country of Last Things is a portrayal of such a 
struggle for an authentic existence in a dystopian predicament where humankind is 
thrown into the lowest possible situation. Allegorically, the novel is a laboratory for 
experimenting with human potentiality for being in the face of severely lacking 
conditions for the fulfilment of biological needs, with death always in the 
background. In such a thrown state of life, the protagonist, Anna Blume, is called to 
authenticity against others’ inauthenticity and life-threatening situations, 
highlighting the possibility of living in a dystopia through authentic selfhood. The 
paper thus argues that Auster’s existentialism in this novel is not alien to 
Heidegger’s worldview on human existence. 
Keywords: Auster, authenticity, Dasein, Heidegger, In the Country of Last Things, 
“potentiality-for-Being” 
 
Introduction: Dasein’s “Potentiality-for-Being” 
 In Heideggerian existentialism, Dasein is the very existence of human 
beings in the world regarding the way they cope with the world. However, 
human existence is not limited to the biological needs, that is, it is the sum 
of all the coping strategies which an individual authentically and 
consciously applies to the very course of life from birth to death, having 
recognized the fact that death is always in ambush to unveil itself at any 
moment. For Heidegger, human existence is paradoxically a movement 
towards death, a process within which one can fulfill as many possibilities of 
living as possible. Thus, Heidegger puts utmost emphasis on what he calls 
Dasein’s “potentiality-for-Being,” a concept that is related to 
“understanding” one’s position in the world (183). 
 “Higher than actuality stands possibility,” Heidegger tells us (63). 
According to Inwood, this is to say that “the range of possibilities” with 
which Dasein may test itself “is not fixed.” Inwood further explains that if 
Dasein ignores its “own possibilities” and accepts what “the they” chooses 
for it, it can merely focus on “the present and immediate future” with no 
mindsets fixed on future possibilities (172). In Heidegger’s words, Dasein’s 
“potentiality-for-Being” depends on the phenomenon of “understanding,” 
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that is, Dasein is not something “present-at-hand” like a hammer lying 
somewhere to be or not to be used. Rather, Dasein is “Being-possible,” 
which means that it is a “can-be” or “possibility” in relation to itself, the 
others, and the world (183). Existence is “the gift of the having to be, of 
Dasein as a can-be,” and it is through “understanding” that Dasein’s 
potential is revealed to it (Schalow and Denker 228). Dasein can understand 
the range of its capabilities, and part of such understanding is that Dasein 
can find itself in its possibilities: “As long as it is, Dasein always has 
understood itself and always will understand itself in terms of possibilities” 
(Heidegger 185). It follows that as “Being-possible,” Dasein is “not yet”; it is 
“what it becomes (or alternatively, does not become),” culminating in the 
sentence “Become what you are” (Heidegger 186). However, becoming 
“what you are” is not some pre-established sense of being; it is rather 
becoming conscious over our possibilities to be what we are not yet.  
 Dasein’s “existence” is, therefore, its “possibility of itself: to be itself or 
not itself” (Heidegger 33). According to Heidegger, although Dasein has 
either consciously selected these possibilities or “grown up in them already,” 
it is only “the particular Dasein” that “decides its existence” through 
“existing itself” via its possibilities (33). As such, Heidegger adds, Dasein has 
“Being-in-the-world” as one of its basic features in its routine “dealings” in 
the world with “entities within-the-world” (95). These dealings make Dasein 
“involved” in the “serviceability” and the “usability” of other entities. For 
instance, Dasein is involved in a hammer, to note Heidegger’s example, to 
make something useful with it. Moreover, Dasein is the only entity that 
understands the intricate relationships that follow from using other entities 
not only to help its own existence in the world but also to let other entities 
happen or come into existence (117).  
 Dasein’s understanding happens through “angst” or “anxiety” 
(Dahlstrom 172). Dasein is already “thrown” in the world and with “the 
they” – a situation which is called Dasein’s “thrownness” or “lostness” in the 
“everydayness” of the world (Heidegger 225). Because of this situation, 
Heidegger believes that Dasein is mostly “inauthentic”; Dasein is mostly the 
“they-self” within a “fallen” state of being, which is to say that, Dasein’s 
“they-self” or “inauthentic” self is its “average everydayness” in the world 
with others (225). This state of being stands for Dasein’s inauthentic escape 




from itself. Yet, it is better for Dasein to choose authenticity and fulfill its 
possibilities, since “the they” has always refrained Dasein from facing its 
possibilities. “Anxiety,” in Heidegger’s worldview, calls Dasein to such 
authentic selfhood; it “individualizes” Dasein in facing its possibilities and 
“discloses” Dasein as “Being-possible.” In other words, it is through 
“anxiety” that Dasein can become free to choose and take hold of itself 
(Heidegger 232). 
 Heidegger calls Dasein’s “potentiality-for-Being” its “Being-ahead-of-
itself” (236). As such, Dasein’s Being, which is “already-in-the-world” with 
other entities, is “ahead-of-itself” in thinking about its future dealings with 
all the things and the people it encounters in the world (237). Dasein for 
Heidegger thus understands that it is always “one possibility or another,” 
that it is constantly “not other possibilities” and is “essentially null” or open 
for other possibilities (331).  
 Moreover, Dasein’s authenticity is “anticipation,” that is, Dasein is “truly 
existent and individualized” when it is consistently “anticipating” the 
ultimate possibility of its death. In anticipating its death, Dasein 
understands its “most unique and uttermost potentiality-for-being.” As the 
“authentic” understanding of “the future,” “anticipation” thus saves Dasein 
from the “inauthentic” future of “falling” in the realm of others (Schalow 
and Denker 52).  
 In general, “Every ‘possible’ possibility offers itself, and this means that 
the impossible ones do so too” (Heidegger 392). In other words, possibilities 
are “contingent,” as Kӓufer interprets Heidegger (357). In fact, Kӓufer adds,  
Dasein exists as born; and, as born, it is already dying, in the sense of 
Being-towards-death. As long as Dasein factically exists, both the 
“ends” and their “between” are, and they are in the only way which 
is possible on the basis of Dasein’s Being as care. . . . As care, Dasein 
is the “between.” (426–27) 
“Care,” in Heidegger’s words, is “the whole of Dasein” (235), which is 
manifested through Dasein in three phenomena until its death: Dasein as 
“ahead-of-itself,” Dasein as “Being-already-in” the world, and Dasein as 
“Being-alongside” the others (237). Heidegger then holds that as “the 
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possibility of the im-possibility of existence,” death terminates Dasein (354), 
which means that Dasein lives and fulfills some of the possibilities of its life 
until death. It is therefore important for Heidegger to acknowledge “the 
possibility of authentic existence” before death, since death shows Dasein 
that “its very Being is the issue” (307). In other words, death is Dasein’s 
“ultimate can-be” (Schalow and Denker 228). 
 Several questions then follow regarding a possible manifestation of 
Dasein as Heidegger sees it: Who can concretize Dasein’s “potentiality-for-
Being” as clearly as possible? Who is the most authentic person to 
consciously consume his/her possibilities in life until death? Are we, as 
Daseins, into our full possibilities in the face of death? While many of us are 
already fallen in our everydayness and may not face authentic people in the 
Heideggerian sense, it is not impossible to find some literary manifestation 
of a Dasein-figure. Such is the case of Anna Blume in Paul Auster’s In the 
Country of Last Things. As far as Auster’s existential worldview is 
concerned, a Heideggerian analysis of this novel can be useful to fill the gap 
in Auster studies.  
Anna Blume as Auster’s Dasein-Figure 
 Auster’s fiction can be interpreted philosophically regarding his 
existential concern with “human existence,” with a Heideggerian tint. 
Through his writings, it is revealed that he is familiar with Heidegger, 
referring in one of his articles to him (Auster, Prose 357), among other 
existentialists. In practice, for example, Auster’s In the Country of Last 
Things abounds in Heideggerian existential overtones. A reading of the 
novel in the light of Heidegger can thus manifest Auster’s own words that 
once a “work is finished . . . interpretations begin,” “philosophical” 
interpretations also included (Prose 124). 
 In the Country of Last Things presents us with a city, which may be part 
of a country in politico-economic turmoil, on the verge of non-existence 
wherein the settlers, thrown into their lowest situation in life, are struggling 
for survival through the lowest possible means. 
 This city has no name, or Auster gives us no name, a technique Auster 
has used to enrich the city with allegorical undertones of a wasteland which 




may befall humankind at anytime throughout history. In this wasteland of a 
city, facilities are broken, buildings and streets are ruined, the weather is “in 
constant flux” (Auster, Country 1), and healthy food is rare. Transportation 
is also broken, and no safety is guaranteed. Stealing is common, and rubbing 
the dead of what is left for them is not shameful. “Newcomers” to the city, 
before learning “the ways of the city,” are “easy victims” for the charlatans 
who dupe them “out of their money” (7). Overall, there is no education, no 
decent job, no humanitarian legal institution; there are no arts and letters, 
no entertainment or sports, no ceremonies, no hope for life in this city. As 
such, suicide is the highest wish for utmost freedom, and voluntary death is 
an established routine.  
 Auster’s wasteland is a place where humankind can only live through the 
least means of survival. Even human feces and corpses are collected to be 
used and burned as fuel. “In a society depleted of almost everything,” As 
Lerate says, people increase the value of decaying objects “in inverse ratio to 
their availability” (126). In fact, “By wanting less, you are content with less, 
and the less you need, the better off you are. That is what the city does to 
you,” as the protagonist Anna Blume says when she enters the city and has 
to deal with its condition to find her missing brother, William (Auster, 
Country 2). Amidst the quick changes that are happening to the city day by 
day, one “is to be prepared for anything” (26). 
 Anna Blume finds herself in the most terrible situation that she could 
ever imagine throughout her life. She is the sole reporter of what is 
happening in the city. Observing the events firsthand upon arrival, Anna 
makes up her mind to find William by all means possible – William was 
sent to the city as a reporter, but he never returned nor did he send any 
reports. Anna’s quest already needs consciousness over her will to survive. 
Thus, “to attach a discernible sense of meaning to her existence within the 
city,” she experiences “an intense struggle for survival” (Martin 154). Anna’s 
method of survival is to make ends meet in as far as there are possibilities of 
survival, even in the face of extreme hunger as she comments on the 
starving situation of the city: “It is also possible to become so good at not 
eating that eventually you can eat nothing at all” (Auster, Country 3). 
However, the stifling situation with which she has to deal in order to find 
her brother plays the background to her heroic attempts. 
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 The citizens’ existential crisis leaves no place for any hopes of survival – 
they are already dying either through hunger or voluntary death. This 
situation allegorizes our own lives at present, as Auster claims in an 
interview: “Anna Blume walks through the twentieth century” (qtd. in 
Hutchisson 36). On the other hand, life as we live it is running before our 
eyes, but we are not conscious over its flux and the way we are wrongly 
running it. In Heideggerian terms, this is a sort of “thrownness” into which 
humankind has fallen. However, it can be tested for its authenticity if one 
wants to take care of one’s self. Auster’s experiment here is to put 
humankind within a dystopia to test human “potentiality-for-Being,” to use 
Heidegger’s term (183), through “a hand-to-mouth existence” (Auster, 
Prose 199). This shall highlight the human beings’ attempts at willing their 
possibilities of living. 
 The possibility/necessity of disclosing this “limit-situation,” as Heidegger 
termed it, to ourselves and hoping for a better future by managing the 
present is not evident to all of us; however, it is not unattainable. Managing 
a “limit-situation” and fulfilling our possibilities requires “anticipation,” 
which reveals to humankind as Dasein that it is “thrown” into the 
uncertainties of its “limit-situation,” that Dasein has possibilities before 
death. By understanding life as a movement towards death, Dasein has in 
fact won its “authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole” through “anxiety” 
(356). Humankind thus becomes conscious of its existential crisis, which in 
Anna’s case is the knowledge of how to survive in a rotten world. 
 The quest for survival for Anna simultaneously serves two purposes: to 
survive, as a human instinct, and to find William. Anna shall thus will her 
survival, a fact not possible within the realm of the miserable people of the 
city. Some citizens are seemingly hopeful for a better future, including “the 
Smilers,” “the Crawlers,” and “the Drummers,” especially regarding the 
weather and how it can help them have fertile lands. However, they are in 
fact escapists who are existentially inauthentic in making the utmost use of 
other possibilities to alleviate the catastrophe. Anna’s response to such 
nonsense on the part of these sects is that the matter of the weather is based 
on “pure luck” (Auster, Country 27), not on “attitudes” or “beliefs” (28). 




  Anna gradually recognizes what is ahead of her in the city. 
Understanding her situation and what is necessary to survive, she initially 
develops some doubts about her purpose: “Bit by bit, the city robs you of 
certainty. There can never be any fixed path, and you can survive only if 
nothing is necessary to you” (Auster, Country 6). However, as Auster’s 
prototype in manifesting the Heideggerian concept of humankind’s 
“potentiality-for-being” (Heidegger 183), Anna has already made up her 
mind to confront anything in her quest. In Anna’s view, in order to survive, 
“you must learn how to read the signs” (Auster, Country 6), so that when 
you walk through the city, “you must remember to take only one step at a 
time. Otherwise, falling is inevitable. Your eyes must be constantly open, 
looking up, looking down, looking ahead, looking behind . . . on your guard 
against the unforeseeable” (5). Anna’s watchfulness metaphorically signifies 
Dasein’s “care” or “anticipatory resoluteness,” as Heidegger puts it, which 
means that one shall be authentically ready for any possibility (374). 
Anything ordinary or extraordinary may happen. “Even if it is for the 
hundredth time,” Anna believes, “you must encounter each thing as if you 
have never known it before” (Auster, Country 7). And the city itself is ruled 
by such “extreme randomness” so that anything may just happen 
(Hyvärinen 1).  
 In the randomness of living in the city, “The essential thing is to survive,” 
Anna says, “if you mean to last here, you must have a way of earning 
money” (Auster, Country 30). Consequently, Anna’s first attempt is to 
become a “scavenger” to roam the streets and find anything valuable (33). 
She does not wish for good things to happen; she believes that “I wish” is the 
“language of ghosts,” since what others “wish for” can include anything “as 
long as it is something that cannot happen” (10). Wishing is inauthentic for 
Anna. In other words, she must survive through the myriad possible forms 
to find her brother. As Auster explains in an article, “Where no possibility 
exists, everything becomes possible again” (Prose 305), or in other words, 
“at each moment there is the possibility of what is not” (306).  
 Death, as the most threatening phenomenon against life, is the most 
rampant thing in the city. While death is commonly ignored as something 
that just happens to all people, as Heidegger put it, it is the sole activity in 
Auster’s wasteland which is done consciously. Due to the lack of biological 
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needs, different kinds of death rule the city, including “a happy death” for 
starving people, the death race for “the Runners” who run until they 
breathlessly die (Auster, Country 11), “solitary deaths” for people climbing 
to the highest places to jump their “Last Leap” (13), and paid deaths for 
people paying assassins or “Euthanasia Clinics” to kill them (14). All these 
types of death, liberating as they are for the suffering laity, do not include 
consciousness over life as “Being-towards-death,” in Heideggerian terms 
(Heidegger 374). Volunteers for death and death institutions have all 
ignored the possibilities of living for the sake of one ultimate possibility, that 
of death. Such an attitude ignores Dasein’s existence which principally 
incorporates the coping strategies undertaken by Dasein between birth and 
death. It is merely Anna who consciously refrains from such an inauthentic 
approach towards life and death: “it’s stupid to die when you don’t have to,” 
Anna holds (Auster, Country 105). Anna is leading a life that is based on 
one’s abilities during one’s life. In Anna’s view, which is paradoxical 
regarding her own survival instinct, 
Still, there are those of us who manage to live. For death, too, has 
become a source of life. With so many people thinking of how to put 
an end to things, meditating on the various ways to leave this world, 
you can imagine the opportunities for turning a profit. A clever 
person can live quite well off the deaths of others. (14) 
Anna believes that others’ deaths are materialistically beneficial for the 
assassins who are legally paid for the assassinations, so that not only the 
victims achieve peace in death but also the assassins live financially better. 
In such cases, as Anna holds, “life goes on as it always has. Death remains 
on the horizon, an absolute certainty, and yet inscrutable as to its specific 
form” (15). Here the victims are awaiting their deaths at every moment, 
while in normal conditions death is ignored so far as people are involved 
with “everydayness” (Heidegger 428). Through death-awareness, as Anna 
says,  
Death is no longer an abstraction but a real possibility that haunts 
each moment of life. Rather than submit passively to the inevitable, 
those marked for assassination tend to become more alert, . . . more 




filled with a sense of life – as though transformed by some new 
understanding of things. Many of them actually recant and opt for 
life again. (Auster, Country 15) 
It is thus through consciousness over death that people become conscious 
over the gift of life; it is through understanding life as “being-towards-
death,” in Heidegger’s words, that life becomes meaningful in making the 
utmost use of one’s possibilities (374). In Auster’s words, the one “who will 
throw himself into life, live[s] life to the fullest of life, and then come[s] to 
his end. For death is a very wall, and beyond this wall no one can pass. . . . 
The question is: at what moment does one begin to see the wall?” (Prose 
306). The city has been surrounded by huge walls which have turned it into 
a big prison from which there is no escape under the present circumstances. 
That is why death is rampant and the citizens are already in their graves. 
These walls can symbolically stand for the threshold of life in the city, that 
is, the walls mean that there is no escape and death is the fate of all. As 
Auster maintains, 
Each man approaches the wall. One man turns his back, and in the 
end he is struck from behind. Another goes blind at the very 
thought of it and spends his life groping ahead in fear. And another 
sees it from the very beginning, and though his fear is no less, he will 
teach himself to face it, and go through life with open eyes. Every act 
will count. . . . He will live because he is able to die. (Prose 309) 
Those who face the wall but turn their backs are those who ignore death, 
and as such they are never ready for death. Those who lose their eyesight in 
the face of the wall stand for those who are always afraid of death and can 
never enjoy their lives. And those who face the wall and take it as the 
threshold of life enjoy the time they have and live their lives in the face of 
death. Death is there as the last possibility of one’s life. In Auster’s view, 
“Until there was death, there was always the possibility there would not be 
death” (Prose 86). Therefore, in order to exhaust all her possibilities, Anna 
continues her quest, while keeping an eye on her chances of survival. “If 
there is such a thing as an art of living,” Auster says, “then the man who 
lives life as an art will have a sense of his own beginning and his own end” 
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(Prose 308). Anna’s belief, likewise, is that “death is the one thing we have 
any feeling for. It is our art form, the only way we can express ourselves” 
(Auster, Country 13). 
 The unpleasantness of the death of others is because of the way death 
reveals itself to them. In Heideggerian terms, death is life-giving when 
considered as a possibility which may happen at every moment in our lives. 
Through the knowledge of death as such, we may direct our lives in a way to 
make the utmost use of our possibilities. In other words, consciousness over 
death leads us towards having the fullest life before death. Saying “death 
happens to all” is the most inauthentic view about life, since death is an 
ultimately personal experience and each person experiences his/her own 
death (Heidegger 298–99). As Anna witnesses dead bodies deprived of their 
possessions by scavengers, she holds: 
But what happens when you find yourself looking at a dead child . . . 
lying in the street without any clothes on . . . ? What do you say to 
yourself then? It is not a simple matter . . . to state flatly and without 
equivocation: “I am looking at a dead child.” . . . the thing before 
your eyes is not something you can very easily separate from 
yourself. (Auster, Country 19)  
For Anna corpses on the streets are objects of contemplation regarding the 
nature of life, and not as some means of survival for scavengers by rubbing 
them of their possessions. Corpses are not just dead bodies; Heidegger 
considered corpses as possible objects of contemplation for the students of 
“pathological anatomy” whose achievements are directed to “the idea of life” 
(282). Anna is the one who is making sense of life in the face of “the 
dilemma” she faces: 
That is the dilemma. One the one hand, you want to survive, to 
adapt, to make the best of things as they are. But, on the other hand, 
to accomplish this seems to entail killing off all those things that 
once made you think of yourself as human. . . . In order to live, you 
must make yourself die. That is why so many people have given up. 
For no matter how hard they struggle, they know they are bound to 




lose. And at that point it is surely a pointless thing to struggle at all. 
(Auster, Country 20) 
According to Marin, “as opposed to a resolute determination to challenge 
the workings of the system, the majority relinquish responsibility” and 
cannot resist “the sinister logic of the city,” “blindly” accepting their 
powerlessness (157). Anna is just about to lose herself in the 
meaninglessness of others’ lives when she runs into Isabel, an old 
scavenging woman, and saves her life just before Isabel is trampled upon by 
a group of death runners. Anna’s hopes for survival are then rejuvenated by 
seeing Isabel trying to make her life as tolerable as possible. Living in the 
face of others’ death and miseries, Anna declares: 
Lives continue to be lived, and each one of us remains the witness of 
his own little drama. . . . Let everything fall away, and then let’s see 
what there is. Perhaps that is the most interesting question of all: to 
see what happens when there is nothing, and whether or not we will 
survive that too. (Auster, Country 29) 
From Anna’s realistic viewpoint, “It takes years of living in the city to get to 
that point,” and she confesses that she “was only a novice . . . who could 
barely find her way” from one part of the city to another. Yet, she had “a 
certain youthful enthusiasm” from the beginning to keep her going, “even 
when the prospects were less than encouraging” (35). Anna, step by step, 
comes to understand the potentialities she has for expressing her being (in 
the worst condition ever). “Everything falls apart,” she tells us, “but not 
every part of everything, at least not at the same time” (36). The only thing 
that can deprive us of our being and possibilities of living is death. There are 
still pathways to hold on to, in any situation. Limitations do exist, but they 
are self-willed: “I might have done better, I think,” Anna says, “but there 
were certain lines I drew within myself, limits I refused to step beyond. 
Touching the dead, for example” (36).  
 Life with Isabel refreshes Anna’s hope of life. Anna’s company is also 
helpful for Isabel, since everything was on Isabel’s shoulders before Anna 
moved in. In turn, it is Isabel who teaches Anna how to survive best in the 
streets and where to look for the best objects as a scavenger. Moreover, 
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Anna has become “a drudge, the sole support of two people,” Isabel and 
Ferdinand who would not have survived without her support (Auster, 
Country 57). Anna’s survival quest to find her brother has therefore led, in 
its course, to the survival of others: “Without me,” Anna holds, “they would 
not have lasted ten days” (58). One is to live as authentically as possible, but 
this endeavor is best fulfilled if one helps others live their lives as fully as 
possible. However, Anna’s attempts end up in vain for the already lost soul 
of Ferdinand, a fact represented by his ships-in-bottles “as a sign of inner 
stress” (52) – while ships are made to sail in open waters, a bottle for a ship 
is a limiting situation. In fact, Ferdinand has chosen to live inauthentically. 
 “As a modern Columbus figure” reporting her experiences in a new 
world in her notebook (Lerate 124), Anna differs from Columbus in some 
ways. While Columbus found the beginning of America, Anna finds its end. 
However, Anna is “dreaming of a new beginning” at the end of the world 
just like Columbus dreamed of a new beginning for Europeans at the 
beginning of the Renaissance (Nyström 36).  
 In order to survive, Anna shall undergo some transformation by having 
her hair cut in order not to call much attention to her beauty while 
scavenging. Having been partly deprived of her former identity, Anna keeps 
herself conscious of the reason why she has lost it: “Horrible consciousness, 
horrible, horrible consciousness,” Anna repeatedly tells herself (Auster, 
Country 65). Put differently, Anna is living the untold life story which 
involves the “facts and figures” about the city that her brother was to send 
back home (28). She is thus reciting an untold manual that she has to put 
into practice in the most conscious manner; otherwise she is a loser: “A 
moment or two when your attention flags,” she tells us, “a single second 
when you forget to be vigilant, and then everything gets lost, all your work is 
suddenly wiped out” (82). Anna’s viewpoint is metaphorically directed to an 
existential point about how to live. Following the loss of her scavenging cart 
as a source of survival, she does not lose hope; she changes the misfortune 
into a possibility of more action – to stop scavenging altogether. 
 On Isabel’s roof, while throwing Ferdinand’s corpse down to the street, 
Anna says, “For the first time since my arrival, I had proof that the city was 
not everywhere, that something existed beyond it, that there were other 




worlds besides this one. It was like a revelation” (Auster, Country 74). Anna 
sees here what lies beyond her limiting situation. Her bird’s-eye view, 
metaphorically as someone looking down at people’s everydayness, lets her 
criticize the inauthenticity of others’ ways of life. She is always conscious 
over what is still possible, over what has not happened yet. Others’ 
forgetfulness and ignorance is what stands before her as she criticizes the 
very ignorance of people about the loss of their memories. Once a guard at 
bay tells Anna that he does not know what an airplane is when she asks 
about it. In Anna’s opinion, “What still exists as a memory for one person 
can be irretrievably lost for another, and this creates difficulties, insuperable 
barriers against understanding” (88). A person who still knows something is 
an alien in the eyes of the increasing number of forgetting people. In other 
words, an authentic individual suffers among inauthentic people. “How can 
you talk to someone about airplanes, for example,” Anna explains, “if that 
person doesn’t know what an airplane is?” (88–9). According to Auster, “the 
country Anna goes to might not be immediately recognizable, but I feel that 
this is where we live. It could be that we’ve become so accustomed to it that 
we no longer see it” (qtd. in Hutchisson 12). So far as Anna comes from an 
intact world, one may say that she has still some memories of the old world 
which may finally disappear, as she is entangled in the country of last things. 
However, she has written down her memories in her notebook, all intact. As 
Parini holds, “Anna hits upon a notion that reverberates throughout 
Auster’s fiction: the interconnectedness of present reality and memory” 
(29). Auster’s own points expressed in one of his interviews are revealing 
here: 
A crisis occurs when everything about ourselves is called into 
question . . . it’s at those moments when memory becomes a most 
powerful force in our lives. You begin to explore the past, and 
invariably you come up with a new reading of the past . . . and 
because of that you’re able to encounter the present in a new way. 
(qtd. in Hutchisson 42) 
After Isabel’s death, Anna happens to find an alternative source of 
inspiration in Samuel, her brother’s friend, whom she finds unexpectedly in 
a library. Their relationship soon develops as a symbiotic cohabitation – 
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Anna has money and Samuel has shelter. Anna writes that through Samuel 
she “had been given the possibility of hope” (Auster, Country 107). Samuel 
also knows so much about the city, so that he is still hopeful of getting out of 
it. His unwritten book also inspires Anna: “as long as we kept working on 
it,” Anna says, “I realized, the notion of a possible future would continue to 
exist for us” (114). Sam’s book in fact serves the possibilities of living in the 
city. Anna also considers the possibility of bearing a child to concretize “a 
new world to begin” (117). Although continuously facing problems of 
survival, Anna is not refraining from reproducing herself in her child. As 
Auster points out, “each ejaculation contains several billion sperm cells . . . 
which means that, in himself, each man holds the potential of an entire 
world. And what would happen, could it happen, is the full range of 
possibilities” (Prose 95). Anna faces new difficulties time and again even 
after her acquaintance with Samuel. Her fall from the butchery window to 
escape her murder is the critical point in her survival quest. According to 
Auster, “In the most important scene of In the Country of Last Things, 
Anna Blume jumps through a window on the top floor of a building in 
order to save herself; she’s not killed, but it changes the course of her life” 
(qtd. in Hutchisson 95). Anna loses her unborn baby in the fall, an event 
which puts her in mental turmoil after she recovers her health in Woburn 
House.  
 Woburn House is “by any standard . . . a haven, an idyllic refuge from 
the misery and squalor around it” (Auster, Country 139). There Anna meets 
people trying to help the citizens survive by providing them with provisional 
food and shelter. It was initially founded by the late Dr. Woburn who 
believed that “noble actions were still possible” (131), and that “the little we 
can do we are doing” (132). The House is now run by his daughter, Victoria 
who acts just like her father. There are also other people who dutifully serve 
the residents under Victoria, including the old Otto Frick, his grandson, and 
Boris Stepanovich. Boris constantly reminds others that “A man must live 
from moment to moment, and who cares what you were last month if you 
know who you are today?” (146). His own coping strategies are in fact 
sources of inspiration and courage for others at Woburn House, as Anna 
tells us: 




Stepanovich never really expected you to believe what he said, but at 
the same time he did not treat his inventions as lies. They were part 
of an almost conscious plan to concoct a more pleasant world for 
himself – a world that could shift according to his whims, that was 
not subject to the same laws and bleak necessities that dragged down 
all the rest of us. (147) 
Boris has “managed to float above his circumstances;” he has “imagined 
every possibility in advance,” and thus he is “never surprised” by what 
happens (147). There is also Victoria who is “stubborn” and holds out “until 
the last” (154). In particular, Victoria is a great help with Anna’s mental 
peace, giving her “the courage to live in the present again” (157). 
 At Woburn House, Otto defines Anna’ name for her: “A-n-n-a. Back and 
forth the same, just like Otto myself. That’s why you got to be born again” 
(Auster, Country 133). Even before that, Auster has presented us with the 
importance of life for Anna, manifested in her struggles for survival through 
her full name. When she introduces herself as “Anna Blume” to Samuel, he 
replies: “Blume. As in doom and gloom.” And Anna replies: “That’s right. 
Blume as in womb and tomb” (101). Signifying the process of life between 
birth and death, Anna is reborn at Woburn House, instead of her unborn 
baby. She is reborn after each catastrophe, so long as death hides itself. 
Anna’s hardheadedness is always with her, even from the very beginning of 
the novel when she decides to hold unto herself away from the wanderings 
of others: “I am all common sense and hard calculation. I don’t want to be 
like the others. I see what their imaginings do to them, and I will not let that 
happen to me; . . . I am going to hold on for as long as I can, even if it kills 
me” (11). As far as living in “the country of last things” continues, 
“everything happens too fast,” “shifts are too abrupt,” and “what is true one 
minute is no longer true the next” (25). Likewise, so long as Dasein is 
stretched between life and death, it is its “potentiality-for-being” (Heidegger 
183). As such, everything is contingent and anything can happen. In Anna’s 
words, “facts fly in the face of probability” (Auster, Country 22), a view 
Auster emphasizes in more explicit terms in Winter Journal: “all life is 
contingent, except for the one necessary fact that sooner or later it will come 
to an end” (5). Moreover, since political issues do influence urban 
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conditions, Anna tells us, “Governments come and go quite rapidly here, 
and it is often difficult to keep up with the changes” (Auster, Country 86). 
Since changes are not necessarily positive, the best thing is to let ourselves 
change. In Heidegger’s words, “a change of the world presupposes a change 
of the conception of the world,” and that conception will be achieved by “a 
sufficient interpretation” (qtd. in Puspitosari 2015), as that of Anna. In 
Anna’s view, “Our lives are no more than the sum of manifold 
contingencies, and no matter how diverse they might be in their details, they 
all share an essential randomness in their design” (Auster, Country 143–44). 
In fact, humanity “must be prepared for every contingency” (186), since 
“anything is possible” (188). What remains is our death, the ultimate 
possibility of nullity.  
 Open-endedness is a postmodernist technique which can represent the 
Heideggerian concept of “potentiality-for-being”. When a story does not 
end, it has already echoed the ontological oscillation it incorporates 
regarding the destiny of its characters. “The sense of endings” in Auster 
fiction is, “at least in his early prose,” a “developmental stage, one yielding to 
new beginnings and a whole new realm of probability and possibility” 
(Neagu 2012). Moreover, Anna has “the voice of a Scheherazade” (Varvogli 
74), or is “a Scheherazade-like, life affirming” person (Neagu 2012), 
someone whose quest is to survive and test the possibilities of living in the 
cruelest condition. However, it should be noted that Anna’s letter is not a 
tool for survival as some critics hold by comparing it to Scheherazade’s tales 
as means of survival. Anna is not another Scheherazade proper; she is 
merely like her in so far as she succumbs to the very act of story-telling 
when her life is in danger. The act of reporting on events by Anna needs her 
survival as its only prerequisite. In other words, the presence of the letter she 
has written highlights Anna’s success with coping strategies in the face of 
problems. According to Auster, “The little phrases that appear a few times at 
the beginning – ‘she wrote’ or ‘her letter continued’ – put the whole book in 
a third-person perspective. Someone has read Anna Blume’s notebook” 
(qtd. in Hutchisson 12). The plot development of the novel reveals that 
Anna’s letter has finally reached Anna’s lover, who turns out to be David 
Zimmer in Auster’s next novel Moon Palace. Zimmer is in love with a girl 
called “Anna Bloom or Blume” who “had suddenly taken off to join her 
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older brother, William, who worked as a journalist in some foreign country, 
and since then Zimmer had not received a word from her – not a letter, not 
a postcard, nothing” (Auster, Moon 86). Auster also emphasizes this issue in 
another interview, announcing Anna Blume as “the person Zimmer is 
desperately waiting to hear from” (Auster and Siegumfeldt 116).  
 Anna’s story is “a story of triumph” (Barone 8); however, her fate is not 
sealed yet, just like the end of her letter. When the novel ends, Anna is 
history, and we cannot say for sure whether Anna will live happily ever 
after. On the other hand, while Scheherazade tells stories to survive, and her 
life is finally bestowed on her, Anna’s story is an introduction to the 
process-orientedness of the duration of life in the face of death. Anna’s life is 
more practical than Scheherazade’s, and she is a great figure in so far as she 
does her best to survive in recording her attempts as a manifesto of survival. 
The end does not matter while the individual is involved in the process, in 
the possibility of survival. Death is the ultimate possibility, so why should 
one bother oneself with the end? As Heidegger holds, life is “being-towards-
death” (374). In Anna’s words,  
The end is only imaginary, a destination you invent to keep yourself 
going, but a point comes when you realize you will never get there. 
You might have to stop, but that is only because you have run out of 
time. You stop, but that does not mean you have come to the end. 
(Auster, Country 183) 
Within a “multicursal” labyrinth, “the wanderer’s progress is contingent on 
the choices he makes at each forking path” (Shiloh 92), and no center is 
apprehended. The city of Auster’s novel is such a labyrinth. As Pascariu 
argues, knowing the city and “its labyrinthine structure” for Anna means 
getting to know its “paths and bifurcations” to reach its “centre or exit.” 
However, Pascariu continues, directions constantly shift, and Anna’s 
decisions and choices are entirely based on “intuition,” which is never 
basically logical, and mostly leads to “frustration and disorientation” (681). 
This city is already a Minotaur-haunted city, gradually killing all its captives. 
Such “decenterment” gives the postmodern labyrinth infinite possibilities of 
action, as Hoffman argues: “Decenterment adds to the labyrinth the 
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modality and creativeness of infinite possibilities” (416). There is no center 
to hold onto for Anna then. Anna is thus on her own to make sense of her 
potentiality-for-being, considering her life as “a process of constructing 
order out of chaos” (Woods 113). Anna believes that “[u]tter despair can 
exist side by side with the most dazzling invention; entropy and 
efflorescence merge. . . . It all has to do with a new way of thinking. Scarcity 
bends your mind toward novel solutions” (Auster, Country 29). In the 
Country of Last Things is thus, in Auster’s words, a manual explaining “how 
one lives in a kind of chaos” (qtd. in Hutchisson 166). As Boris tells the 
others on leaving Woburn House, “Unless we begin to look ahead, there 
won’t be much further for any one of us. . . . Make plans. Consider the 
possibilities. Act” (Auster, Country 155). These words are also reflected in 
Auster’s comments in an article: “When no possibility exists, everything 
becomes possible again” (Prose 305), or in other words, “at each moment 
there is the possibility of what is not.” Playing with the concept of 
contingency, Auster holds that “one can always choose one’s moment” 
(306). Anna thus begins her existential manifesto by saying, “At times my 
weakness is so great, I feel the next step will never come. But I manage. In 
spite of the lapses, I keep myself going” (Auster, Country 2). Anna’s sense of 
life and human existence as struggle do make her “a true heroine” in 
Auster’s oeuvre, as the author himself emphasized in one of his interviews: 
I find it [In the Country of Last Things] the most hopeful book I’ve 
ever written. Anna Blume survives, at least to the extent that her 
words survive. Even in the midst of the most brutal realities, the 
most terrible social conditions, she struggles to remain a human 
being, to keep her humanity intact. . . . It’s a struggle that millions of 
people have had to face in our time, and not many of them have 
been as tenacious as she is. I think of Anna Blume as a true heroine. 
(qtd. in Hutchisson 36) 
Conclusion 
 Anna has survived her quest to send her letter, so far as her letter has 
been delivered. In a naturalistic way, Auster has picked up a young girl from 
a well-established city and thrown her into the middle of a catastrophic 




situation to test her survival will. Auster’s choice of a dystopia rather than 
any well-established place serves the question of the meaningfulness of life 
and human existence, particularly in the worst situation. It might be 
surprising that until a catastrophe befalls humankind, no functionality of 
seemingly valueless stuff can be truly comprehended. This fact serves two 
issues: possible living through the lowest forms of life and attacking 
consumerism. What Heidegger terms as the “present-at-hand” and the 
“ready-to-hand” are therefore significantly relevant: the objects around us 
and those made by us to serve us are not necessarily functional in a dystopia. 
In other words, it is the condition that deems what is functional and what is 
useless for humans. Auster’s novel shows a time when even human waste is 
of utmost importance for living, denouncing the functionality of 
consumerism at hard times.  
 In the Country of Last Things thus tells us to make much of our time and 
resources in life. And this requires, as Heidegger believes, a change in our 
understanding of the world, manifested in Anna’s recognition of her 
situation in the world of the novel. Dasein, as a coping being, is thus tested 
here through the utmost coping capabilities of its being to survive. Death, 
wrongly understood by the citizens, has in fact become a way of managing 
life through suicide, while it is the last possibility after testing all the means 
of survival in the eyes of Anna and the members of Woburn House.  
 Allegorically, the novel depicts a laboratory to experiment with human 
potentiality for being in the face of the very lack of the essential means of 
survival. In such extreme Heideggerian “thrownness,” in which most people 
are gradually dying with no sense of living, Anna is called to authenticity in 
the face of the inauthenticity of the mass of people and the limitations of the 
situation. Auster’s city seems like a purgatory to test humankind’s attempt 
at survival, so that life would be gained upon victory. What is mostly evident 
in the novel – which is also seen in Auster’s other novels regarding his play 
with chance – is that whenever something good is going to happen, 
something evil interferes. It necessitates taking for granted all the 
possibilities of one’s state of being in the world, as Heidegger holds, which 
in turn necessitates adapting oneself to the new conditions of living in a 
wasteland. Anna thus chooses, as a possibility of survival, to disguise herself, 
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tolerate famine and bad weather, cope with her situation, not care for her 
losses, and never commit suicide before the certainty of death. 
 Anna is not alone in her survival quest. Manifesting adaptability to any 
condition, the remaining Woburn House members have tried to survive 
through insufficient resources, and thus seem to have mastered their 
situation rather than having become its slaves. Part of this struggle is 
communal, as they cooperate to run the House and share what they have 
with each other. Communal survival manifests a unique order in that 
dystopia, an important factor that is promising to save not only the House 
administrators’ lives but also the lives of the people outside, a fact that 
counters the impotency of the government to care for its citizens. Pursuing 
Dr. Woburn’s beliefs, the members of Woburn House symbolize 
authenticity. In Anna’s words, they all willed to survive, especially Anna 
herself through contemplating how to accept the given and deal with it.  
 One’s weakness, if confessed, reveals one’s state of inauthenticity. 
Understanding it is the first step to overcome it. And when you overcome it, 
you may acknowledge your “potentiality-for-being.” Through what we can 
term as Auster’s existential manifesto of survival, in the manner of what he 
wrote autobiographically in Hand to Mouth, In the Country of Last Things 
presents us with Heidegger’s Dasein’s will to make everything possible 
through life in the face of death. Thus, human existence in this novel 
incorporates as part of human “potentiality-for-being” such issues as the 
will to survive, understanding the “limit-situation” and adaptation to it, 
mutual cooperation with the “Dasein-with” of others for Dasein’s own 
highest self-fulfillment, the importance of discourse in expressing one’s 
existence to the world, the role of death in living one’s life, the truth of hope 
hidden in one’s future possibilities, and the contingency of the worldly 
affairs. These all constitute Dasein’s coping strategies and its range of 
possibilities from birth to death, making Dasein the master of its situation. 
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TUBITAK I „POTENCIJAL ZA BITAK“ U PUSTOJ 




















Rad predlaže čitanje romana Paula Austera U zemlji posljednjih stvari (1987) kroz 
konceptualnu perspektivu Heideggerove teorije tubitka. Naglasak se stavlja na 
Heideggerovu definiciju ljudske prirode kao tubitka i pritom se raspravlja o 
rasponu egzistencijalnih mogućnosti na koje njemački filozof upućuje ljudska bića 
kako bi prije smrti postigla autentičan osjećaj vlastitoga bića i života. Kretanje od 
rođenja prema smrti predstavlja tubitkovo stanje bitka, odnosno egzistenciju. 
Međutim, rijetki su svjesni toga procesa te su izgubljeni u ograničavajućoj situaciji 
svakodnevnog života. U skladu s time, neautentični su životi nesvjesni vlastitih 
mogućnosti. Fikcionalna vizualizacija tubitkovih pokušaja autentičnoga 
postojanja unutar svoje ograničavajuće situacije ili, mogli bismo reći, unutar svog 
u 
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uobičajenoga društva, može na bolji način konkretizirati Heideggerove tvrdnje. 
Kada je u pitanju Austerov egzistencijalni pogled na život, U zemlji posljednjih 
stvari prikaz je jedne takve borbe za autentično postojanje u distopijskom svijetu u 
kojem je čovječanstvo svedeno na najnižu životnu situaciju. U alegorijskom smislu, 
roman predstavlja laboratorij za eksperimentiranje s ljudskim potencijalom bitka 
suočenog s izuzetno nepovoljnim uvjetima za ispunjenje bioloških potreba 
neprestano praćenima smrću koja vreba iz prikrajka. U takvom teškom životnom 
okruženju protagonistica Anna Blume osjeća poriv prema autentičnosti usprkos 
neautentičnosti drugih ljudi i sveprisutnoj smrtnoj opasnosti, pritom naglašavajući 
mogućnost života usred distopije na temelju autentične svijesti o sebi. U radu se 
stoga tvrdi da je egzistencijalizam u Austerovu romanu blizak Heideggerovu 
svjetonazoru o ljudskom postojanju. 
Ključne riječi: Auster, autentičnost, tubitak, Heidegger, U zemlji posljednjih stvari, 
„potencijal bitka“  
